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ABSTRACT: Corruption is one of the key problems facing the Russian state as it seeks to 
evolve out of its socialist past.  Naturally, regional patterns of corruption exist across a country 
as large and diverse as the Russian Federation.  To explain these variations, we analyze 2002 
data from Transparency International and the Information for Democracy Foundation that 
provides the first effort to measure differences in incidence of corruption across 40 Russian 
regions.  We find that corruption in Russia primarily is a structural problem, and not one related 
to its institutions.  Within each region, the amount of corruption increases as the size of the 
regional economy grows, the per capita income decreases, and the population decreases.  Russian 
policymakers can therefore work to reduce corruption by encouraging economic development 
outside of the key centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg.  Because the data show that voter 
turnout also lowers corruption, policymakers can also fight corruption by fostering more political 
accountability in elections. 
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Corruption in Russia 
 
  Corruption is one of the key problems facing the Russian state as it seeks to evolve out of 
its socialist past. In the cross-national Corruption Perceptions Index prepared by Transparency 
International (TI), Russia ranked a lowly 86 out of 133 countries in 2003 and 71 out of 102 
countries in 2002 (Transparency International, 2002 and 2003). The World Bank also ranks 
Russia in the bottom third of countries with a score of -0.90 in 2002 on its scale of -2.5 to 2.5 
(Kaufmann et al., 2003). Freedom House's Nations in Transit also scores Russia low for 
corruption, giving it a rating of 5.75 in 2003 on its scale of 1-7, in which 7 is the worst (Freedom 
House, 2003).
1  
  But such national level surveys provide little more than a superficial picture of a country 
as large and diverse as the Russian Federation. To make up for this shortcoming TI and the 
Information for Democracy Foundation (INDEM) conducted a survey of 40 regions in 2002 that 
provides the first effort to measure differences in the levels of corruption across the Russian 
regions (Transparency International, 2002). Though flawed in terms of methodology, the survey 
demonstrates that there is extensive variation at the regional level. Given this variation, some 
regions might point the way to reducing corruption in Russia and, for that reason alone, this 
unique dataset deserves greater analysis and attention.  
  The overall finding of differences in the levels of corruption across the regions raises 
several interesting research questions: What factors explain these differences? Would theories 
used to explain corruption in other contexts, such as southeast Asia, tell us something useful 
about Russia? How can Russia design an anti-corruption policy that is truly effective rather than 
simply promoting the interests of particular politicians at election time? 
 
Types of Business-State Relations 
 
Corruption is the use of public office for private gain. While corruption is one of the key 
problems defining Russian development, it is only one of many possible forms of relations 
between business and the state. Conceptually, these relations can range from socially productive 
                                                 
1 In "A Normal Country," Shleifer and Treisman argue that corruption in Russia is about what one would expect for 
a country at its level of political and economic development. However, they cite existing evidence selectively to 
make their point and lump together various kinds of corruption at the political and day-to-day level.    3
arrangements to pathological outcomes (Maxfield and Schneider 1997).  Effective and useful 
relations between business and government officials are typified, for example, by rationalizations 
in Germany’s declining industries negotiated through corporatist bargaining or by strategic 
investments in Japan’s economy arranged in consultations between industry and the Ministry of 
Industry, Trade and Investment (Katzenstein 1978).  Harmful relations, on the other hand, are 
typified by secretive, corrupt exchanges in what della Porta and Vannucci refer to as a black 
market for political rents (della Porta and Vannucci 1999).   While relations between business 
and government may exhibit a dominant pattern in a country, these relations can vary from one 
sector or ministry to another and can change over time. 
 
Theories to Explain Variations in Corruption Across Russian Regions 
 
  A number of theories may explain the variation in corruption across the Russian regions. 
For analytical clarity, we divide these theories into different families of causation. The first 
group of theories is institutional. Theories in this family focus on such variables as the coherence 
of the state, the centralization of the business sector, and the ethnic composition of sub-national 
governments resulting from the federal system.  
  Another group of theories looks at social issues. In this group, theory suggests that 
urbanization may explain higher levels of corruption because it weakens the social control of 
family and religion. Another variable in this family is social capital, higher levels of which may 
lead to lower corruption levels. In Russia, divergent agricultural systems generated a more 
market and network-intensive northern belt, which may have generated higher levels of social 
capital, and a patriarchal southern belt, which may have generated lower levels of social capital. 
  A third family of variables emphasizes the role of politics. Here such measures as voter 
turnout and the level of media freedom may offer insights into the variation in corruption levels 
across Russian regions. 
  A final family of variables focuses on structural issues. Cross national studies of 
corruption emphasize the importance of such variables as population size, gross regional product 
per capita, gross regional product, and the presence of natural resources in explaining different 
levels of corruption. In the following sections, we will explain how to apply these general 
theories to the Russian context.   4
 
Institutional Theories 
 
The first theory we seek to apply to Russia was not developed with Russia's specific 
features in mind. Using it in the Russian context thus provides us with a method of testing how 
well it travels from the region it was developed to explain, namely southeast Asia, to other parts 
of the world. Potentially, the theory will be useful in illuminating what is happening in Russia. 
However, the Russian experience could prove to be different than what the theory would predict 
and could therefore lead to a revision or extension of the theory.  
 David  Kang's  Crony Capitalism seeks to explain different levels of corruption in South 
Korea and the Philippines by classifying business-government relations in each country by how 
concentrated or dispersed the business sector is, and how coherent or fractured the state is. He 
argues that countries characterized by state capture (fractured state, concentrated business 
community) or a predatory state (coherent state, dispersed business sector) have the highest 
levels of corruption
2, countries characterized by a competitive market (fractured state, dispersed 
business) have the lowest levels of corruption, and countries characterized as mutual hostages 
(coherent states, concentrated business) have corruption levels that fall somewhere in between.  
(See Figure 1) 
Table 1  Types of Corrupt Relationships (level of corruption) 
  Coherent State  Fractured State 
Concentrated Business  Mutual Hostages (medium)  State Capture (high) 
Dispersed Business  Predatory State (high)  Competitive Market (low) 
 
  It should be noted, however, that other outcomes are possible than the four corruption 
scenarios predicted by the model. For example, a coherent state combined with a dispersed 
business sector could lead to a developmental, rather than a “predatory” state, if the political 
leader chose to use the abilities of the state to ensure the peaceful development of all business 
groups. The model simply suggests that this outcome is less likely. 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of the negative consequences of state capture in the Russian regions, see (Slinko, Yakovlev, 
Zhuravskaya, 2003)    5
  Not surprisingly, it is difficult to apply these simplified characterizations to countries or 
regions that are extremely complicated. Even Kang had trouble applying his own criteria to the 
case of Taiwan in his book. Recognizing such limitations, we try to apply this analysis to Russia 
at both the national and regional levels.  
  Following Kang, "a state is coherent if it can formulate preferences independent of social 
influences and if political leaders have internal control over their bureaucrats."
3 The most 
coherent situations exist when political leaders have full control over their political organizations 
and state employees so they can use domestic politics to ensure their continued rule. At the other 
end of the spectrum, the most fractured situation occurs when "leaders survive only tenuously, 
when they engage in constant conflict with political organizations over the form and content of 
the state and bureaucrats can play off 'multiple principles' to their own advantage. At the heart is 
the question of control." 
  Over the more than ten years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian state at 
the federal level has evolved from one that was largely fractured to one that is now much more 
coherent. President Vladimir Putin is the legitimately elected president, who maintains 
consistently high public opinion ratings. He completely dominates his political party, United 
Russia, and has established a dominant majority within both houses of the country's bicameral 
legislature. Within some limits, he has extensive influence over the country's regional leaders. 
The initiatives for key reforms, such as overhauling the country's federal system or the budget 
and tax codes, come from the president and his key allies. In these cases, the leadership acts on 
its party and society rather than responding to them.
4 
  Much more controversial is whether Putin actually controls his bureaucracy. Consistently 
over time, there seem to be two factions working within the bureaucracy in pursuit of their own 
interests: on one hand is an alliance of the law enforcement, security agencies, and military 
usually lumped together as the "power ministries"; on the other is a group associated with 
economic reform. Observers differ on the degree to which one or the other of these groups is in 
control and the extent to which Putin can stand above them and regulate their conflict or is 
subject to their demands. Over time the relative power of the two groups varies, as does their 
influence over the bureaucracy.   
                                                 
3 Kang, 13-14 
4 For overviews of the early part of Putin's term, see Shevtsova (2003) and Herspring (2003).    6
  Regardless of the state of the battle between these factions, there is considerable agency 
slack between the Russian leader and his bureaucrats. Some even argue that the bureaucracy 
controls everything (Kabanov et al, 2003).
5 Decisions of the federal government are notoriously 
unenforced across the country's great expanse. Powerful businessmen and regional politicians are 
often able to purchase or influence federal bureaucrats to do their bidding especially since the 
Russian civil service does not use examinations or other measures of professional merit to fill 
vacancies. Some innovative politicians, such as Presidential Envoy to the Volga Federal District 
Sergei Kirienko, have sought to implement such a system in parts of the federal bureaucracy, but 
the method has not caught on or been generally implemented.  
  Kang defines a strong, concentrated business sector as one including diversified business 
groups, "comprised of well-organized firms that cover many sectors of the economy." The 
companies may have subsidiaries that are import competing and others that are export oriented, 
and may have agricultural and urban firms (Kang, 1999, 14). Following Kang, these larger 
business groups are more likely to attempt to influence government policy and to wield political 
influence.  
  Russia’s business sector fits Kang’s depiction of concentration reasonably well. Russia's 
business groups evolved out of the chaos of the early 1990s and gained control of lucrative state 
assets in 1995 and 1996 in exchange for helping Yeltsin win a second term as president 
(Hoffman, 2002). Although the Russian business community was considerably weakened by the 
1998 financial crisis in the country, the business sector is now even more concentrated than 
South Korea's was in the period Kang studied. Kang notes that in South Korea in 1975, the five 
largest private conglomerates accounted for over 7 percent of the entire economy in terms of 
sales, with the 20 largest conglomerates comprising almost 15 percent of the economy. In Russia 
in 2003, sales by the five largest conglomerates accounted for 12.7 percent of the GDP.
6 
Measuring the market value of the top five private firms (Yukos, LUKoil, Surgutneftegaz, 
Sibneft, Norilsk Nikel) as a proportion of GDP shows that these firms are worth 24.4 percent of 
                                                 
5 See discussions in Reddaway (2002) and chapters by Igor Klyamkin and Marie Mendras in Mendras (2003). 
6 Calculated from the rankings of the 200 largest companies by sales produced by Expert, September 29, 2003 
(www.expert.ru/expert/ratings/exp200/exp2003/spisok1.htm) and 2002 GDP estimate at the CSIS Russia/Eurasia 
Program Website (www.csis.org/ruseura/rus_econ0306.htm). The five largest companies were LUKoil, Yukos, 
Surgutneftegaz, Tyumen Oil Company, and Sibneft.   7
Russia's annual output. The largest firms are concentrated in oil and metals, but they also have 
interests in banking, car manufacturing, and increasingly in agricultural production.
7 
 Additionally,  since the beginning of the Putin era, the leaders of all of Russia's top 
businesses are members of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP). Putin 
effectively organized this group so that it would be easier for him to deal with the business 
community. During 2000-2003, he met with the organization a few times a year to discuss key 
issues relating to the economy. While the impetus for the organization came largely from the 
state, it provides the businessmen with a way to express their collective voice. It also gives them 
access to the president that they might not have otherwise.  
  Although Russia does not fit neatly into any one of Kang's four categories, since the early 
1990s, it has evolved from a situation of state capture by business during the Yeltsin era to one 
of mutual hostages four years into Putin's rule. The current Russian situation fits into the mutual 
hostages category because a coherent state under Putin is facing a heavily concentrated business 
community.   
  Putin started his relationship with the business community as president on the basis of an 
unwritten deal. He essentially promised not to reevaluate the often shady privatizations that took 
place in the 1990s, in exchange for efforts by the businessmen to invest their profits in Russian 
industry rather than sending them abroad and agreeing to stay out of the political sphere.  
  This deal stayed in effect from the summer of 2000 through the summer of 2003, when 
the Kremlin launched its campaign against the Yukos oil company and its leader Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, Russia's richest businessman. In the months preceding his arrest, Khodorkovsky 
had made contributions to Russia's opposition parties and had hinted that he might run for 
president himself. The Kremlin arrested Khodorkovsky in an attempt to block his rise as an 
independent politician. By the end of 2003, Putin was threatening the business community 
claiming that he might begin reversing all privatizations that were conducted in violation of the 
law, a vague threat that could be applied to anyone. Moreover, despite its concentration of 
wealth, the business community demonstrated its weakness when the RSPP, the most high 
profile business association in Russia, did not step up to Khodorkovsky's defense. 
  Nevertheless, despite the extent of Putin's crackdown on Yukos, the Kremlin is unlikely 
to take on the business community as a whole. The heavy concentration of the business 
                                                 
7 For additional information on the role of big business in the Russian economy, see Dynkin, 2004.    8
community means that an attack on it could lead to an economic downturn and political 
instability. In fact, business is now well represented in the parliament following the State Duma 
elections of December 2003 and Putin's reform of the upper house Federation Council. Despite 
the exceptional case of Yukos, business plays a powerful role in Russian politics and sets clear 
limits on what the state can do.  
  Additionally, the designation of Russia as a mutual hostages situation suggests that 
Russia may be able to develop economically even though it has relatively high levels of 
corruption. South Korea was able to follow this path, even though observers often found it 
counterintuitive (Schleifer and Vishny, 1993). 
  Characterizing the state-business relationship in the Russian regions is a much more 
complicated task than doing it for the country as a whole. It is extremely difficult to obtain 
consistent data across regions. The kind of information available at the national level is simply 
not available at the regional level.  
  Nevertheless, to compare state cohesiveness or fracturation across a wide number of 
regions, it is possible to employ a broad-gauge comparative technique, which counts the number 
of veto players. Andrew MacIntyre used veto players to study government effectiveness in 
southeast Asia. He defined such players as "an individual or collective actor that has the 
institutionalized power to defeat a proposed law by withholding formal approval." (MacIntyre, 
2003, p. 37) He found a variety of systems across the countries he studied: Indonesia with one 
veto player in the form of the president and Malaysia with one veto player in the form of a 
particular political party had concentrated political systems, whereas the Philippines with three 
veto players and Thailand with six had fragmented political systems.  
  To use this technique in the Russian regions, the definition must be relaxed a little. 
Rather than focusing on formal legislation, which is not always crucial to governance in Russia, 
it makes more sense to concentrate on the power of the executive. Operationally, then, the 
question becomes: can the governor freely implement his policies, whether in the terms of 
executive decrees or regional legislation or are there veto players that can block his actions? 
Using this approach makes it possible to classify the 40 regions we examine as having either a 
"coherent" or "fractured" state. In this context, a coherent state is one where the governor does 
not face any serious veto players, while a fractured one is where power is more widely 
distributed and the governor faces opposition to his endeavors.   9
  Making such judgments requires gathering extensive amounts of information on the 
regions and distilling it in a concise way to place a region in one category or the other. Such 
information can be found in the back issues of the Russian Regional Report, dating to 1996, the 
summary volume The Republics and Regions of the Russian Federation: A Guide to Politics, 
Policies, and Leaders (Orttung, 2000), and the rankings of regional leaders compiled by 
Rostislav Turovskii and posted at www.politcom.ru 
  Thus, for example, it is possible to categorize Russia's major cities of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, which also have the status of being two of Russia's 89 constituent regions, in terms 
of the number of veto players. In Moscow, there is only one veto player in the person of the 
mayor since he does not have any difficulty implementing his policies and the city council 
largely serves as a rubber stamp. Moscow is labeled "coherent." The St. Petersburg governor, on 
the other hand, faces a strong, independent legislature that can effectively block his or her 
actions. In 2003 Governor Vladimir Yakovlev was unable to force the city legislature to rewrite 
the city charter so that he could stand for a third term. So, the region is labeled "fractured" since 
there are at least two veto players in the city. 
  Moving to the economic sphere, we defined the regional business communities as 
concentrated if there are several big companies operating in the region. We labeled them 
dispersed where only small and generally local companies were present (Orttung, 2004).  While 
Russia at the national level has evolved from state capture to mutual hostages, the situation in the 
regions varies considerably. Of the 40 regions we examined 13 fell into the mutual hostages 
category and four fell into the competitive market category. The others were either defined by 
state capture or predatory state.  
 
Table 2 Business-State Relations in 40 Russian Regions 
  Coherent State  Fractured State 
Concentrated 
Business 
Mutual Hostages  
Arkhangelsk Oblast 
Belgorod Oblast 
Chelyabinsk Oblast 
Kemerovo Oblast 
Krasnodar Krai 
Moscow City 
Novgorod Oblast 
Omsk Oblast  
State Capture 
Altai Krai 
Krasnoyarsk Krai 
Kurgan Oblast 
Leningrad Oblast 
Moscow Oblast 
Nizhnii Novgorod Oblast 
Novosibirsk Oblast  
Perm Oblast   10
Rostov Oblast 
Saratov Oblast 
Tomsk Oblast 
Tula Oblast 
Yaroslavl Oblast 
Primorskii Krai 
Ryazan Oblast 
St. Petersburg 
Samara Oblast 
Stavropol Krai 
Sverdlovsk Oblast 
Tyumen Oblast 
Ulyanovsk Oblast 
Volgograd Oblast 
Dispersed 
Business 
Predatory State  
Bashkortostan  
Karelia Republic 
Khabarovsk Krai 
Pskov Oblast 
Tatarstan Republic 
Voronezh Oblast 
 
Competitive Market 
Amur Oblast 
Tambov Oblast 
Tver Oblast 
Udmurtia Oblast 
 
  
   A second institutional variable that may affect corruption levels is the ethnic dimension 
of the country’s federal structure. In particular, 21 of Russia's 89 constituent units are designated 
as "republics" specifically established for a minority ethnic group, while others simply are 
defined territorially and do not favor any particular group. One would expect the ethnically 
defined regions to have higher levels of corruption since they are based on ethnic set asides that 
purposely benefit one ethnic group over everyone else (Hale 2003). Observers point out that the 
ethnically defined regions typically have more authoritarian regimes than do the territorially 
defined ones.  
  We coded the regions for whether they were republics or not in order to determine if 
there was any correlation between their federal status and the levels of corruption.  
 
Social Theories 
 
  Social issues constitute another possible explanation for variation in corruption levels. 
Putnam (1993) found that northern Italy was better governed than southern Italy because its 
citizens had much denser networks of linkages and trust and were more likely to be involved in 
social groups than their southern compatriots. He traced the differences far back in Italian 
history.    11
  Northern and southern Russia have different climates making possible different kinds of 
agricultural production on their territory. These variations led to the practice of different types of 
serfdom, which in turn created totally different types of societies.  
  During the 18th century, the fertile south, with its Black Earth lands, became increasingly 
distinct from the more barren north (Riasanovsky, 1984, 277-8). The barshchina style of 
serfdom, which largely resembled slavery, developed in the south. The serfs farmed their 
masters' land, performed other tasks for him, and worked their own plots. In the north, the obrok 
practice evolved as the soil could not support extensive farming so the peasants had to seek 
others forms of employment such as working as craftsmen and artisans to pay off their 
obligations to the landlord and the state. Where no work was available the peasants would leave 
their home to find jobs and they often joined associations to work as carpenters or construction 
crews. 
  Over time the different forms of agriculture created diverging cultures that continue to 
mark society in the current era. One would expect greater levels of corruption in the more 
patriarchal south where social stratification was more extreme and social capital was lower. 
Likewise, one would expect less corruption in the north as denser networks of exchange 
developed in the more market-intensive systems. Higher levels of trust were necessary in the 
north in order to support its more complex economy. It is possible to code the regions along the 
lines of their serfdom and regress them against the numbers reported by Transparency 
International and INDEM. The TI/INDEM researchers anecdotally noted a correlation in their 
findings with higher levels of corruption in the "southern belt" stretching from Rostov Oblast to 
the Trans-Volga area (Grigorian, 2003).   
 Urbanization  provides  another  social explanation for divergent corruption levels. As 
Schlesinger and Meier note, “urban environments loosen the social controls of family and 
religion and at the same time concentrate government programs and resources” (Schlesinger and 
Meier 2003, 4). With weaker social controls and greater opportunities for corruption, theory 
suggests that urbanization would increase corruption. 
 
   12
 
Political Theories 
 
Another way of explaining the difference in levels of corruption is through the different 
kinds of political regimes - with closed regimes generally being more corrupt than open ones. As 
stressed by Rose-Ackerman, “Combining an informed and concerned electorate with a political 
process that regularly produces closely contested elections leads to a world in which corruption 
is limited by competition” (Rose-Ackerman 1978, 213). One way to measure political 
competition is through voter turnout. When turnout is higher, more citizens are exercising their 
check on leaders and bolstering this mechanism of vertical accountability.  
Voter turnout is a better indicator of political accountability, however, where there are 
meaningful choices among political candidates and where voters are informed and not subject to 
intimidation. To measure voter turnout, we relied on the regional turnout figures for the 1999 
State Duma elections (Central Electoral Commission, 2000). In this race, voters chose between 
the group around the then recently appointed prime minister Vladimir Putin and the group 
around his main opponents, Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov and former Prime Minister Yevgeny 
Primakov. 
A related measure of political competition is freedom of the press. Cross nationally, 
countries with freer presses are less likely to face extensive corruption because the free press 
provides greater accountability. The Free Media Institute Free Media Index provides a measure 
of press freedom for each region in Russia, which can be analyzed in conjunction with the 
corruption data (www.freepress.ru).  
  One major methodological problem here, though, is that working with media freedom 
data in Russian conditions is extremely tricky. Ordinarily, one would expect a freer media to be 
strongly correlated with a less corrupt society since the media is able to provide greater social 
accountability. However, in an authoritarian system a state controlled media may be able to 
produce corruption perception survey results that suggest that there is less perceived corruption. 
In authoritarian societies, the political leaders use the media to signal to the population what they 
should say and think about their own society. The media would naturally report the official claim 
that there is no corruption and individuals, when confronted with a questionnaire presented by a   13
stranger, would be likely to repeat the official line out of fear of being punished for deviating 
from the leadership's wishes.  
  Thus, in Russia it would be logical to find low levels of perceived corruption in regions 
with tightly controlled media. Likewise, one might also find high levels of perceived corruption 
in regions with more free media, since in those regions the public is more informed about the 
corruption in the region, but might not be in a strong enough position to do something about it.  
  Increasingly, the Russian federal press is coming under state control and is less free to 
provide real oversight of government policymaking. In 2003, Freedom House moved its 
evaluation of the Russian media from "partly free" to "not free" because the Kremlin took control 
of the country's three national television networks 
(www.freedomhouse.org/research/pressurvey.htm) 
  Governors often exercise control over regional media in the same way that the Kremlin 
manages to control the national press. However, at the regional level, there are sometimes 
competing business interests that are able to fund alternative media. While none of the resulting 
media outlets strive for unbiased objectivity, they at least provide alternative points of view, 
allowing their audience access to a variety of opinions.  
  
Structural Theories 
 
  Finally, the literature on corruption suggests correlations between corruption and such 
structural variables as the size of the population and the economy, and the extent of economic 
development. We included variables for population size (Treisman 2000b), gross regional 
product (GRP), and the presence of natural resources. The logic here is that the more people, the 
larger the economy, and the greater the abundance of resources, the greater are the opportunities 
for corruption. On the other hand, the higher the levels of economic development (GRP/capita) 
(Tresiman 2000a, 429), the lower the incentive to resort to corruption and the greater the 
resources available for the state’s administrative capacity to prevent and punish it. In short, we 
would expect to see the amount of corruption increase in larger population centers, but decrease 
as the level of economic development increased.  
   14
Data to Test the Theories 
 
  We use the data released by Transparency International and the Information for 
Democracy Foundation (INDEM) on October 9, 2002 as an indicator of corruption in the 40 
regions that they examined. Though flawed, the TI/INDEM data is the best available in judging 
sub-national levels of corruption in Russia.
8 The organizations have devoted considerable 
resources to this research and plan to conduct future studies.
9 Therefore it is worthwhile looking 
at the current numbers and identifying ways to improve them.  
  First, the TI surveys are based partially on people's perceptions of corruption.
10 Beyond 
the well-known problems inherent in this kind of research, there are problems specific to the 
Russian regions. Bashkortostan, which is generally described in the media as one of the most 
authoritarian republics, topped the TI/INDEM list as the cleanest region with a 0.000 perceived 
index of corruption. Since Bashkortostan has an extremely authoritarian leadership and a state 
controlled media, which rarely, if ever, discusses the problem of corruption in the region, people 
either are unaware of the problem, or, more likely, afraid to mention it to survey takers.  
  Likewise, the republic of Karelia, in Russia's northwest, has one of the highest levels of 
perceived corruption in the survey, though one would not expect that to be true. Here, the 
problem is that the region borders with Finland, so the respondents naturally compare themselves 
with their foreign neighbors, concluding that they must have a relatively large amount of 
corruption since their local situation seems much worse than that in Finland, though it could 
objectively be much better than the situation in Bashkortostan.  
  Second, there is an extremely low level of correlation (.33) between the composite 
TI/Indem index measuring people's overall perception of the level of corruption and the index 
relying on experienced-based information, which asks people about how much money they pay 
in bribes. The fact that there is not greater connection between the perceived level of corruption 
and the more objective measure of the amount of corruption suggests that there is a lot of 
randomness in the data. Because of the greater objectivity of the experience-based information, 
                                                 
8 The data has already had a useful impact in Russia, where it has drawn analytical attention to the issue of 
corruption among policy-makers and the public. The regional data angered some governors to the extent that they 
destroyed the printrun of the newspapers containing them, according to INDEM director Satarov (Satarov, 2003). 
9 A representative of INDEM confided to one of the authors that the organization had conducted a second survey of 
corruption in the regions, but was hesitant to publish the results because they poorly correlated to the first study.  
10 For a critical analysis of using perception based data in regard to the Russian regions, see Luneev 2003.   15
we use the survey’s index of the amount of regional corruption as a percentage of GRP in our 
regression analyses. 
  Third, a further problem was that the interviewers did not poll enough people to produce 
meaningful distinctions between the 40 regions. The survey polled 5,666 citizens and 1,838 
representatives of small and medium-sized business in the 40 regions. Although the researchers 
claimed that this sample size was unprecedented for this type of research, it was not enough to 
produce scientifically valid results to make regional distinctions.  
 
The Results 
 
  The data give strong support for the structural explanations of corruption. (See Figure 1.) 
Three of the four structural variables are statistically significant, and they can alone explain 42.5 
percent of the variation in corruption. The size of the economy and the level of development 
have almost an equal and opposite impact on corruption, in the direction predicted by the theory, 
with levels of corruption rising with the size of the economy and decreasing as the level of 
development rises. On the other hand, the population variable has a negative correlation with 
corruption levels, suggesting that Russia’s less populated regions have more corruption. Most 
likely this is so because the smaller areas in Russia tend to be governed by a tightly-knit political 
and economic elite that works hard to foster a closed system that blocks any encroachments by 
outside actors (Solanko, 2003, and Shleifer and Vishny, 615).  
  After these three structural variables, two other variables are almost statistically 
significant and explain more of the variation in corruption levels than the rest of the variables. 
Urbanization has a standardized coefficient of .372 and voter turnout has a standardized 
coefficient of -.278, both in the direction predicted by the theory, namely corruption rises with 
increased urbanization and falls with higher voter turnout.
11   
  The other variables do not approach statistical significance or have substantial 
standardized coefficients. These data suggest that institutional variables and social variables do 
not explain much of the variation in corruption levels. 
                                                 
11 In regions like Bashkortostan, turnout is unusually high because the authoritarian regime uses its resources to 
make sure people vote, but in these regions levels of perceived corruption tend to be low, so the region still fits our 
model. However, in these exceptional cases, the explanation is not that higher participation reduces corruption, but 
that authoritarian regimes can artificially increase voter turnout and reduce perceived levels of corruption.    16
 
Table 3 Regression Results explaining Amount of Corruption 
 
Model  R  R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1  .873(a)  .763  .605 .194521
a  Predictors: (Constant) Log GRP, LogGRPcp, LogPopult, Natural Resources, Urbanization, Serfdom, 
Duma Turnout, Media Freedom, Pattern, Federal Structure 
 
  Coefficients(a) 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model     B  Std. Error Beta  t  Sig. 
(Constant)  6.875 2.724   2.524  .023
Log GRP  .533 .110 1.554 4.848  .000
LogGRPcp  -2.924 .701 -1.534 -4.174  .001
LogPopult  -.421 .186 -.509 -2.265  .039
Natural 
Resources  .002 .003 .153 .754  .463
Urbanization  .010 .006 .372 1.755  .100
Serfdom  .039 .104 .064 .371  .716
Duma 
Turnout  -.016 .009 -.278 -1.683  .113
Media 
Freedom  -.010 .010 -.248 -1.030  .319
Pattern  -.003 .063 -.009 -.049  .962
1 
Federal 
Structure  -.015 .196 -.016 -.079  .938
a  Dependent Variable: Amount of Corruption 
 
 
Conclusions and Implications for Anti-Corruption Policy 
 
The findings of this paper have clear implications for how Russia should address its 
corruption problem. The clearest message from the analysis is that corruption in Russia is a 
structural problem, not one related to its institutions. Within each region, the amount of 
corruption increases as the size of the regional economy grows, the per capita income decreases, 
and the population decreases.  
  Corruption is thus deeply embedded in the Russian economy and may not be affected by 
institutional efforts to eradicate it. By focusing enormous attention on such business-state 
relations problems as the fate of Khodorkovsky and his Yukos company, western politicians, the   17
popular press, and some academic observers are missing the real story about the pervasive 
corruption inherent in the system. Structural forms of corruption are not greatly affected by the 
fate of one businessman or the Kremlin's current political strategy.  
  However, the situation is not completely bleak, as the data here also point to ways to 
address Russia's corruption problem. Since the level of corruption seems to drop as regions 
develop economically, one clear implication is that Russia can reduce corruption by encouraging 
economic development outside of the key centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Unfortunately, 
the trend line is not optimistic here as "regional inequality increased from 1992 through 1998, 
dropped after the crisis of August 1998, and has on balance increased since 1999, but without a 
clear trend," according to Economist Philip Hanson (Hanson, forthcoming). A greater focus on 
regional development could have a beneficial impact by reducing levels of corruption.  
  Additionally, the data strongly suggest that higher levels of political activism on the part 
of the population, particularly holding politicians accountable at the ballot box, will help cut 
corruption levels. Here too, unfortunately, the trend line is not particularly encouraging. After 
reaching a high of 64.4 percent in 1995, turnout rates for the State Duma elections fell to 61.8 
percent in 1999 and then dropped further to 55.5 percent in 2003, returning almost to the level of 
1993 (54.4), when the elections were held shortly after Yeltsin sent in the tanks against Russia's 
former parliament. The enormous use by incumbents of official resources to shape election 
results is turning off Russian voters and giving people the sense that their input into the electoral 
process is pointless.  
  Even though President Vladimir Putin set up a presidential commission to combat 
corruption on November 24, 2003, his efforts to address this issue will have little impact as long 
as his administration does not focus more on regional development and ensuring the sanctity of 
the voting process. Current Russian policy is not only not aimed at reducing corruption in a real 
way, it is also undermining the very forces that could help reduce corruption.  
  Our application of institutional theories such as the one laid out in Kang's Crony 
Capitalism developed to explain corruption and development in South Korea and the Philippines 
provide some interesting insights into the Russian situation. Most importantly, the comparison 
suggests that the Russian state cannot go too far in attacking the business community because 
Russian big business is highly concentrated. An all-out attack by the state against business would   18
have harmful political and economic consequences for Russia. Putin and Russia would pay a 
high price if he did follow such an offensive strategy. 
  Unfortunately, however, Kang's style of analysis did not produce significant results in 
explaining the variation in corruption across the Russian regions as measured by the TI/Indem 
survey. Perhaps future studies will be able to show how Russian institutions, such as the 
business-state relationship, are related to corruption. This analysis was not able to demonstrate 
such a link.   19
Appendix 1 
Sources for Political Evaluations in Table 2 
 
Altai Krai: Robert Orttung, Danielle Lussier and Anna Paretskaya eds., The Republics and 
Regions of the Russian Federation: A Guide to Politics, Policies, and Leaders (Armonk, NY: M. 
E. Sharpe) 2000. (Hereafter RRRF) 
 
Amur Oblast: (RRRF) and Oleg Zhunusov, "Amur Elects Communist Duma Deputy Governor," 
Russian Regional Report, April 11, 2001.  
 
Arkhangelsk Oblast: RRRF 
 
Belgorod:  RRRF  
 
Bashkortostan: Aleksandr Kidenis, "Bashkirbashi. Udastsya li prezidentu respubliki i na etot raz 
sdelat' vybory upravlyaevymi?" Novaya gazeta, September 8, 2003, 
(2003.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2003/66n/n66n-s19.shtml) and Igor' Rabinovich, Aleksandr 
Nikonov, Sergei Viktorov, Dzhamal Ginazov, "Dinastiya: Pochemu Rakhimov-mladshii 
obrechen stat' preemnikom Rakhimov-starshego," Ekspert-Ural, October 21, 2002 
(www.ekspert.ru) 
 
Chelyabinsk Oblast: "Sumin enjoys strong support in Chelyabinsk" (RRRF) 
 
Karelia Republic: "Katanandov Wins Another Term in Karelia," Russian Regional Report, May 
8, 2002.  
 
Kemerovo: RRRF 
 
Khabarovsk Krai: Robert Orttung, "Ishaev: Strong Governor Holds Tight to Power," (July 22-25, 
2001 trip report), Russian Regional Report, August 22, 2001.  
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Krasnodar Krai: S. Danilchenko, "Krasnodar Krai Gubernatorial Elections Underway," Russian 
Regional Report, September 7, 2000.  
 
Krasnoyarsk Krai: Andrew Yorke, "Business and Politics in Russia's Regions: the case of 
Krasnoyarsk kray," M.Phil Thesis submitted to St. Antony's College, Oxford University, 2002. 
 
Kurgan Oblast: Lyudmila Kolbina, "Spyat Kurgany temnye?" Ekspert, Ural, no. 36, 30 
September 2002 (www.expert.ru, accessed 28 June 2003).  
 
Leningrad Oblast: Robert Orttung, "The Variety of Business-Politics Relations in Leningrad 
Oblast" and "Investors Flock to Petersburg's Rural Neighbor," (trip report July 1-August 15, 
2002), Russian Regional Report, August 12, 2002.  
 
Moscow Oblast: RRRF 
 
Nizhnii Novgorod Oblast: Gul'naz Sharafutdinova and Arbakhan Magomedov, "Volga Federal 
Okrug" in Peter Reddaway and Robert W. Orttung, eds., The Dynamics of Russian Politics: 
Putin's Reform of Federal-Regional Relations Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003 and A. V. 
Dakhin, "Dualizm demokratii i avtoritarnosti," Polis, no. 4, August 31, 2003, 108-119.  
 
Novgorod Oblast: RRRF, p. 383. 
 
Novosibirsk Oblast: Robert Orttung, "Executive-Legislative Relations Confrontational in 
Novosibirsk, Irkutsk," (trip report, 16-17 July, 2001) Russian Regional Report, July 23, 2001. 
 
Omsk Oblast: Maksim Shandarov, "The Siberian Federal Okrug," in Peter Reddaway and Robert 
W. Orttung, eds, The Dynamics of Russian Power: Putin's Reform of Federal-Regional 
Relations, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield), 2003. 
 
Perm: Robert Orttung, "Perm Party Politics: A Swamp" (trip report April 1-4, 2001), Russian 
Regional Report, April 11, 2001 and N. Lapina and A. Chirikova, Strategii Regional'nykh elit:   21
ekonomika, modeli vlasti, politicheskii vybor, Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 2000, 
Chapter 2.  
 
Primoskii Krai: Numerous reports in the RRR detailing conflicts between the governor, 
legislature, and mayor. A. P. Konyakina and N. V. Shinkovskaya, "Parametry evolyutsii 
politicheskogo rezhima v primor'e," Polis, no. 2, April 30, 2003, 143-149. 
 
Pskov: RRRF 
 
Rostov: N. Lapina and A. Chirikova, Strategii Regional'nykh elit: ekonomika, modeli vlasti, 
politicheskii vybor, Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 2000, Chapter 1.  
 
Ryazan Oblast: Vladimir Avdonin, "Ryazanskaya olbast': ot strukturnogo dualizma - k 
'soobshchestvu elit," in V. Gelman, S Ryzhenkov, M Bri, eds, Rossiya regionov: transformatsiya 
politicheskikh rezhimov (Moscow: Ves' mir), 2000, 219-256, especially p.245. 
 
St. Petersburg: Vadim Goncharov, "Constituent Services Strengthen Incumbents," Russian 
Regional Report, January 16, 2003.  
 
Samara: (RRRF).  
 
Saratov: Vladimir Gel'man, Sergei Ryzhenkov, Igor' Semenov, "Saratovskaya oblast': pobeditel' 
poluchaet vse," in V. Gelman, S Ryzhenkov, M Bri, eds, Rossiya regionov: transformatsiya 
politicheskikh rezhimov (Moscow: Ves' mir), 2000, 109-145. 
 
Stavropol: Natalia Zubarevich, "The Southern Federal Okrug," in Peter Reddaway and Robert 
W. Orttung, eds., The Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin's Reform of Federal-Regional 
Relations (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield), 2003. 
 
Sverdlovsk Oblast: RRRF and numerous reports in the RRR describe conflict between governor 
and mayor.    22
 
Tambov: RRRF; Dmitrii Sel'tser, "Tambovskaya oblast' (1989-1995): Razvitie politicheskoi 
situatsii," in K. Matsuzato and A. B. Shatilova, eds., Regiony Rossii: khronika i rukovoditeli, Vol. 
1, Krasnyi poyas (Tsentral'noe chernozem'e), Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido 
University, June 1997, 83-157; "Tambovskii tovarishch," Profil', June 10, 2002, 92-98. 
 
Tatarstan: RRRF 
 
Tomsk: RRRF 
 
Tula: RRRF 
 
Tver Oblast: Boris Gubman, "Kompromat as a Political Weapon: Governor's Campaign Starts in 
Tver," Russian Regional Report, February 18, 2003. 
 
Tyumen Oblast: This region is divided into three separate pieces. There is a governor for the 
whole region and governors for two of the constituent pieces. The regional governor must 
constantly work with the other two to ensure support for his policies. (RRRF) 
 
Udmurtia: Beth Mitchneck, "Regional Governance Regimes in Russia: Comparing Yaroslavl' 
with Udmurtia," in Jeffrey W. Hahn, ed., Russian Regionalism in Transition: Studies from 
Yaroslval', Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001, 169-193, especially, 183-185 
and 187. 
 
Ulyanovsk Oblast: Sergei Gogin, "Ulyanovsk Legislature Give Governor a "D" on Economic 
Performance," Russian Regional Report, December 12, 2001.  
 
Volgograd Oblast: Vladimir Gel'man, "Vologradskaya oblast: strukturnyi plyuralizm i 
neustoichevyi bitsentrizm," in V. Gelman, S Ryzhenkov, M Bri, eds, Rossiya regionov: 
transformatsiya politicheskikh rezhimov (Moscow: Ves' mir), 2000, 181-218. 
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Voronezh Oblast: Yuliya Fedorinova, "Voronezh Governor Wins Sympathetic Legislature," 
Russian Regional Report, April 2, 2001.  
 
Yaroslavl: Jeffrey W. Hahn, "The Political Transformation of Yaroslavl': Transition to 
Democracy?" in Jeffrey W. Hahn, ed., Russian Regionalism in Transition: Studies from 
Yaroslval', Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001, 41-74, especially p. 68. 
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